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This paper studies how monetary easing provides incentives for banks to take
risk and issue mortgage‐backed securities (MBS) and, because MBS have the
“lemon” property, why MBS buyers are willing to purchase high‐risk securities
at high prices. Banks need equity to attract deposits. Monetary easing reduces
this need, and banks leverage up and reduce their monitoring efforts. The
internal need for liquidity and risk sharing motivates banks to issue MBS.
Security buyers understand the moral hazard problem that banks face but
are willing to purchase bank securities at high prices because monetary easing
would also reduce their cost of funds.
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On what caused the financial crisis of 2008, there are two
schools of thought. One, represented by the chairman of
the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, holds financial dereg-
ulation and the consequent outburst of exotic financial
innovation such as mortgage‐backed securities (MBS)
the primary cause (Bernanke, 2010). The other, advanced
by John Taylor (2008, 2012) and others, holds monetary
policy as the primary factor contributing to the unprece-
dented U.S. housing boom that eventually led to the crisis.
Although some researchers blame MBS for providing
banks with additional liquidity and incentives to take
excessive risk (Dokko et al., 2009), we conjecture that
monetary easing policies induced banks first to take risk
and then to sell MBS as a rational response to meet capi-
tal constraints or to transfer risk away. Indeed, Figure 1
shows that the issuance of MBS did not lead to explosive- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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ce & Economics Published by Johngrowth until 2002. The timing coincides with the onset of
a low interest rate period. Furthermore, Figure 2 shows
an almost one‐to‐one correspondence between the
subprime MBS market value and subprime mortgages
from 2003 to 2006. A divergence is seen in 2007, when
the MBS market suffered a major correction. Thus, a cou-
ple of questions naturally arise: Could monetary policy be
a driving force behind the surge in subprime mortgages?
Would banks have then hedged against the increased risk
of their loan portfolio by selling more MBS? If both ques-
tions can be answered in the affirmative, monetary policy
and financial innovations cannot be treated as parallel
and equally responsible for the housing bubble. Rather,
the former may be considered the definitive cause and
the latter a consequence.
In a previous study, Xu and Zhang (2017) show that if
the central bank cuts its benchmark interest rate, com-
mercial banks will lower their lending standards by- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
nse, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the
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FIGURE 1 Total mortgage‐backed securities issuance in the
United States (billions of dollars; source: sifma.org report) [Colour
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 2 Subprime mortgage and subprime mortgage‐backed
securities (MBS) in the United States (billions of dollars; source:
sifma.org report) [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
2 ZHANG AND XUallowing their clients to borrow more against the same
collateral. We know that a higher loan‐to‐value ratio is
one feature of subprime mortgages. However, when gaug-
ing the relative importance of monetary policy and MBS
in generating the housing bubble, Xu and Zhang (2017)
do not discuss why and to what extent banks would use
MBS but set the MBS values exogenously.
In this study, we build a partial equilibrium model
and examine how banks adjust their asset portfolio, par-
ticularly by using MBS, in response to changes in mone-
tary policy. The literature identifies two motivations for
banks to securitize loans: relaxation of capital constraints
(also known as demand for liquidity, Altunbas,
Gambacorta, & Marques, 2009; Berger & Udell, 1993;
Carlstrom & Samolyk, 1995; Cerasi & Rochet, 2014;
DeMarzo & Duffie, 1999) and transferring portfolio risks
to third parties in the financial market (Dahiya, Puri, &
Saunders, 2003; Dell'Ariccia, Igan, & Laeven, 2012;
Marsh, 2006). These two motivations are considered as
benefits of issuing MBS, which we model explicitly. Weshow that lower interest rate induces risk taking of banks,
and therefore, their demand for liquidity and risk sharing
increases.
Issuing MBS also incurs costs, due to asymmetric
information and adverse selection problem in the MBS
market. As widely acknowledged by the literature, the
MBS market is a market for lemons (Downing, Jaffee, &
Wallace, 2009). The risk of the MBS depends on the effort
that banks spend on monitoring or screening the quality
of the supporting asset. However, this effort is not observ-
able to security buyers. In this case, the MBS is
undervalued. Banks need to signal their effort, for exam-
ple, by retaining some of supporting asset on their own
book (DeMarzo & Duffie, 1999; Gorton & Pennacchi,
1995), to attract securities buyers. Moreover, the price
that buyers are willing to pay for the MBS also depends
on the policy rate, because their cost of fund depends
on it. Lower interest rate booms the demand for MBS
and causes its price to appreciate, and vice versa. In all,
our model shows that if policy rate is high, the benefits
from issuing MBS are small whereas the costs are large.
Banks restrain themselves from taking too much risk,
and their incentives to securitize mortgages are limited.
By contrast, if policy rate is low, banks increase their risk
taking, and they want to and can securitize their invest-
ment and sell it at high price because low interest rate
alleviates the adverse selection problem.
Assume a commercial bank in a two‐period model.
The bank finances its investment by collecting deposits
from households and its own equity. It pays risk‐free
interest to deposits at the rate set by the central bank.
The cost of bank's equity is assumed to be higher than
the risk‐free interest rate, which is consistent with an
equity premium (Dell'Ariccia, Laeven, & Marquez,
2010). This assumption implies that the bank prefers to
finance its investment with more external fund than
internal fund. However, we make another assumption
that the bank cannot perfectly diversify the risk of its
investment (Carlstrom & Samolyk, 1995; Cerasi &
Rochet, 2014) such that its leverage (defined as the ratio
of deposit over total investment size) is subjected to a
“capital constraint”: The bank must supply sufficient
equity to remain solvent in case of investment failure.
By partly securitizing the investment and selling to third
party investors in exchange for liquidity, the bank bears
less risk. Its capital constraint could be relaxed such that
the bank needs less equity as input but can use more
external finance. This shows the bank's demand for
liquidity. In addition, if the bank is risk averse, issuing
MBS and sharing risk with market bring utility gain. To
maximize its utility, the bank chooses simultaneously
the leverage, the fraction of the investment to be securi-
tized, and the level of monitoring. The loan will be
ZHANG AND XU 3invested in a project with uncertain returns. Although
costly, monitoring the investment may increase the prob-
ability of success. However, the bank's monitoring level is
not observable to everyone, especially to the risk‐neutral
financial investors who purchase the MBS. We thus have
a typical asymmetric information problem here. Because
the bank's assets portfolio, particularly the retention of
MBS, is publicly observable, it plays the role of signalling
the effort level.
By including multiple players, we examine the inter-
actions between monetary policy, the banking industry,
and the financial market. In contrast, most previous
works in the banking literature focus on only one aspect
of these essentially complex issues. No less important,
however, by deriving two propositions from the model,
we establish a linkage from monetary policy to financial
innovation and try to explain the coincidence of surge
in MBS selling and low interest rates (Figure 1 shows that
the total MBS issuance erupted after 2002 when Fed cut
the interest rate to a historical low level).
Under the assumption of risk‐neutral bank, we show
that when the central bank cuts interest rates, the com-
mercial bank takes more risks by increasing leveraging
and decreasing their monitoring efforts (see Dell'Ariccia
et al., 2010; Maddaloni & Peydro, 2011). It securitizes
and sells larger portion of the investment. Although the
returns on the project decline with the level of monitor-
ing, the saving in monitoring cost plus the saving in
equity may yield a higher expected total net income.
Thus, we have Proposition I, formally confirming the cau-
sality from policy rate to MBS. Furthermore, the financial
investor purchases more MBS at a lower policy rate not
only because the securities are “mispriced” following
asymmetric information but also because the opportunity
cost of his capital is lower.
For a risk‐averse bank, the results discussed before
still hold. In addition, the bank has another motive to
securitize its loans, namely, transferring its risk to a third
party in the financial market. We show that when the
bank is risk averse, the causality from monetary easing
to MBS issuance becomes stronger.
This study is therefore a synthesis of the following
studies. Dell'Ariccia et al. (2010) explained why policy
rate cuts induce banks to take more risks but did not dis-
cuss the implications of the increased portfolio risk for
their operation. Gorton and Pennacchi (1995), DeMarzo
and Duffie (1999), and Malekan and Dionne (2012) study
the optimal MBS contract. However, none of these studies
address how changes in policy rate affect banks' decisions
on the magnitude of risk taking and proportion of loans
to be securitized.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents a literature review. Section 3 describes the modelof risk‐neutral banks. We show the effects of monetary
policy on financial innovation, and we discuss the role
financial regulation as a comparison. Section 4 models
the risk‐averse bank. Section 5 concludes the paper.2 | LITERATURE REVIEW
The development of MBS markets has significantly
changed the traditional banking business. Banks today
are not only originators and holders of loans but also dis-
tributors of credit risk. This originate‐to‐distribute model
of modern banking has been criticized as one of the rea-
sons for the recent financial crisis. As banks pass on their
asset risks to financial investors through securitization,
they have less incentive to monitor borrowers and thus
increase the risk of the entire financial system (Berndt
& Gupta, 2009; Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, & Vig, 2010;
Wang & Xia, 2014). Worse still, securitization of bank
loans could spread the risk of the banking industry as a
whole and paralyse the entire financial system (Allen &
Carletti, 2006; Bank for International Settlements, 2006;
Rajan, 2010). However, not many studies have researched
why banks issue MBS, as they are lemons, and why inves-
tors are willing to purchase high‐risk MBS at high prices.
Banks issue MBS mainly for two reasons. One, it eases
their capital constraint, and the other, it transfers out
their credit risk. Banks have economic as well as regula-
tory capital requirements. The former relates to the inter-
nal need for liquidity, whereas the latter is imposed by
regulation or law. When bound by capital constraints,
banks either increase their equity or shift their portfolio
towards low risk‐weighted assets (RWAs). MBS provide
a convenient vehicle for banks to remove their high‐risk
and low‐liquidity loans from the balance sheet and
replace them with cash (Altunbas et al., 2009; Berger &
Udell, 1993; Carlstrom & Samolyk, 1995; Cerasi &
Rochet, 2014; DeMarzo & Duffie, 1999). Even if banks'
capital constraints are not very tight, they might feel
uncomfortable with risk on their loans and may decide
to convert some of them into MBS (Dahiya et al., 2003;
Dell'Ariccia et al., 2012; Marsh, 2006). These assumptions
on bank securitization are generally supported by empir-
ical studies (Affinito & Tagliaferri, 2010; Cardone‐
Riportella, Samaniego‐Medina, & Trujillo‐Ponce, 2010).
Although banks have strong incentives to offer MBS,
why do financial investors buy such “lemon” products
(Downing et al., 2009)? With the presence of information
asymmetry, investors could try to mitigate the so‐called
adverse selection problem by hiring independent rating
agencies to evaluate the securities (J. He, Qian, &
Strahan, 2011) or ask for issuer guarantee (Gorton &
Pennacchi, 1995; Higgins & Mason, 2003). They may also
4 ZHANG AND XUrequire the selling bank to retain part of the security
offering (retention) so that the bank continues to monitor
the underlying mortgages for its own interest (Gorton &
Pennacchi, 1995; Malekan & Dionne, 2012).
Although previous studies explain the existence of the
MBS market, they fail to explain the eruption of MBS
during the 2002–2006 period. Reiss (2009) blames the rat-
ing agencies for misleading investors and for the conse-
quent financial crisis. Dokko et al. (2009) attribute the
sudden popularity of MBS to the failure of investors to
fully understand the lemon problem. However, one criti-
cal question remains unanswered: What caused the rat-
ing agencies to lower their standards and investors to
increase their risk appetite? Demyanyk and Van Hemert
(2011) argue that the risk of MBS was probably masked
under the seemingly ever‐rising house prices during that
period. This argument brings us to the analysis of the
housing bubble of the 2000s. We show that unusually
low policy rates contribute directly to not only house
price inflation (Xu & Zhang, 2017) but also extraordinary
growth of the MBS market in this paper.
In the theoretical banking literature related to securi-
tization, the rate of retention plays a key role (DeMarzo &
Duffie, 1999; Z. He, 2009; Malamud, Rui, & Whinston,
2013; Malekan & Dionne, 2012). It signals the underlying
assets' quality as well as strength of commitment to mon-
itoring the assets. This study shows that the optimal
retention rate is also a function of policy interest rate.3 | MODEL: RISK ‐NEUTRAL
BANKS
3.1 | Model set‐up
We present a two‐period bank lending and securitization
model in this section. A representative risk‐neutral bank
finances its loans using deposits from households as well
as its internal funds (equity) in the first period. It also
determines whether to securitize and sell the loan to a
third party investor and, if so, how much to retain. The
loan is invested in a risky project generating either a high
return rate RH if succeeds or a low return rate RL ≤ 1 if
fails. The investment has to be monitored to decrease
the probability of failure p(a), where a is the monitoring
effort exerted by the bank. We assume that the marginal
benefit of monitoring is decreasing such that p′(a) < 0,
p′′(a) > 0, and also, we impose p(0) < 1, lim
a→∞
p að Þ ¼ 0.
This monitoring effort is not publicly observable and
entails a cost equal to c(a). Following the traditional liter-
ature (e.g., Gorton & Pennacchi, 1995), we assume that
c(a) is a linear and increasing function of a: c(a) = c × a.The total investment size is normalized as 1. In the
first period, the bank supplies its own equity k and col-
lects households deposit 1 − k to finance the investment.
Households are willing to supply deposit if and only if the
bank can repay them R f (1 − k) in the second period
(Carlstrom & Samolyk, 1995; Dell'Ariccia et al., 2010).
R f is the risk‐free rate set by the central bank's monetary
policy. Equity is more costly, with a yield RI, which
features the equity premium. We assume that
RH > RI > R f > RL, and we impose the condition that
(1 − p(0))RH + p(0)RL ≥ R f such that investment is at
least profitable for the bank even if it spends no monitor-
ing effort. Because equity is more costly than deposit,
external fund has the priority in bank's funding. Never-
theless, following Carlstrom and Samolyk (1995) and
Cerasi and Rochet (2014), we assume that the bank can-
not perfectly diversify its investment risk. As a bunch of
literature emphasizes (e.g., Cerasi & Daltung, 2000; Dia-
mond, 1984), bank equity is therefore required by the
market participants to be willing to supply their fund to
the bank. This assumption is conventional to feature the
economic capital constraint (different to regulated capital
constraint) faced by banks. In our model, in case of
investment failure, the bank gains only RL from invest-
ment. Therefore, for a plausible commitment of repaying-
R f (1 − k), depositors will have to impose the economic
capital constraint mentioned above (which we call it sol-
vency constraint hereafter) on the bank as prerequisite
for supplying on‐balance‐sheet funding. We thus have
RL − c(a) ≥ R f (1 − k), where the left‐hand side of the
inequality is the bank's returns if investment fails and
the bank does not securitize and sell any of the invest-
ment. This constraint will be relaxed if the bank issue
MBS, as we shall discuss later.
The bank can securitize b share of the investment and
sell it to a risk‐neutral third party investor in exchange for
liquidity, 0 ≤ b < 1. By doing so, 1 − b share of the invest-
ment is retained on the bank's book. The bank takes the
retention of 1 − b as the signal that it also bears the risk
of the investment and thus has incentives to monitor it.
The investor is willing to buy the security only if its
expected return is equal to or greater than the opportunity
cost of the fund spent on purchasing it. Such opportunity
cost depends on the policy rate set by the central bank.3.2 | Benefits and costs of issuing MBS
By issuing MBS, there are two kinds of benefits. The first
one is the relaxation of solvency constraint, and the second
one is risk sharing. For risk‐neutral banks, the second ben-
efit does not matter. We consider the first benefit here and
the second one in the model of risk‐averse bank.
ZHANG AND XU 5Denote the price of the security b as T, the investor
is willing to pay T if and only if (which is binding in
equilibrium)
1 − p að Þð ÞRHbþ p að ÞRLb ≥ Rf T: (1)
As the bank only retains 1 − b share of risky invest-
ment and sells b in exchange for liquidity, its return in
case of investment failure is given by RL(1 − b) + T − c(a).
Therefore, the solvency constraint imposed by depositors
is given by
RL 1 − bð Þ − c að Þ þ T ≥ Rf 1 − kð Þ: (2)
Under the assumptions of RH > R f > RL and (1 −
p(0))RH + p(0)RL ≥ R f , it is straightforward to obtain
RL(1 − b) + T − c(a) > RL − c(a) (see Appendix A). In
other words, in case of investment failure, the bank's
return with MBS selling is larger than that without.
Therefore, selling MBS relaxes the solvency constraint
and enables the bank to leverage up and to reduce the
supply of equity k. Because equity is more expensive than
deposit, selling MBS benefits the bank by bringing gains
in the expected return of the investment.
Note that such benefit depends negatively on the pol-
icy rate. Condition (1) shows that the selling price of
MBS, T, is decreasing in R f , other things equal. Higher
interest rate implies lower price of MBS, which we con-
firm in equilibrium as well. In addition, as R f increases
and approaches to RI, external finance becomes less
appealing. When policy rate is lower, the bank's prefer-
ence to external finance is more significant, and its incen-
tive to securitize the investment in order to be able to use
more external finance is stronger.
There is also a cost associated with MBS issuance
because MBS is mispriced or undervalued, due to asym-
metric information problem. MBS buyers can only
observe the portfolio of the bank but not its monitoring
effort. For a bank to sell MBS, the benefit from monitor-
ing that increases the expected return is shared by third
party investors, but the cost of monitoring is completely
born by itself. Therefore, the larger the portion of invest-
ment securitized, the lower is the monitoring effort that
the bank will spend. MBS buyers understand this adverse
selection problem, and they are perfectly aware that the
bank may cheat them by reducing monitoring effort on
the supporting asset of MBS without telling them. There-
fore, to make sure the monitoring effort is at the second
best level, MBS buyers require the bank to retain a por-
tion of the investment as a signal that it bears at least
some risk,1 and they impose an incentive compatibility
constraint on the bank. Following the contract design lit-
erature (DeMarzo & Duffie, 1999; Gorton & Pennacchi,1995; Hart & Holmstrom, 1987), the incentive compatibil-
ity constraint can be written as
−p
0
að Þ RH − RL  1 − bð Þ ¼ c0 að Þ: (3)
This constraint says that the marginal benefit of moni-
toring the retained investment equals to the marginal cost.3.3 | The bank's problem and optimal
retention
In Period 1, the bank decides its leverage ratio 1 − k,
monitoring effort a, and retention level 1 − b simulta-
neously based on the potential lump‐sum liquidity gain
T from selling the security. The bank maximizes its
expected return from the investment, subjected to the
participation constraint of security buyers (constraint 1),
solvency constraint (2), incentive compatibility constraint
(3), and 0 ≤ b < 1.
max
k; a; b
1 − p að Þð ÞRH 1 − bð Þ þ p að ÞRL 1 − bð Þ
− c að Þ − Rf 1 − kð Þ − RIk þ T
(4)
s:t: 1 − p að Þð ÞRHbþ p að ÞRLb ≥ Rf T (i)
RL 1 − bð Þ þ T − c að Þ ≥ Rf 1 − kð Þ (ii)
−p
0
að Þ RH − RL  1 − bð Þ ¼ c0 að Þ (iii)
0 ≤ b ≤ 1 (iv)
Here, because security buyers are competitive and risk
neutral, the participation constraint (i) is binding. The
solvency constraint (ii) is also binding under our assump-
tion about depositors. We will check whether (iv) is satis-
fied ex post.
We substitute k and T by constraints i and ii and
assign β as the Lagrange multipliers of constraint (iii) to
obtain the first‐order conditions of the bank's problem
as follows:
b ¼ 1 − −p
0
að Þ RH − RL RI − RI þ RIRf − Rf 2 c
p
00
að Þ
−p0 að Þ R
Iθ − RIRLRf − Rf 2 θ − RL
   ; (5)
p
0
að Þ ¼ − c
RH − RL
 
1 − bð Þ; (6)
k ¼ 1 −
θ
Rf
bþ RL 1 − bð Þ − c að Þ
Rf
; (7)
FIGURE 3 Size of securitization sold to third party investors
(horizontal axis: risk‐free rate decreases from 1.05 to 1) [Colour
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
6 ZHANG AND XUwhere θ ≡ RH(1 − p(a)) + RLp(a) is the expected rate of
return of risky investment. Equation (5) shows that the
optimal retention by the bank, (1 − b), is a function of
the risk‐free rate. Equation (6) shows that the optimal
monitoring effort level is a function of the retention
(1 − b), and Equation (7) determines the optimal leverage
of the bank. To further interpret these equations, we need
to make an explicit assumption regarding the effect of
credit screening on a given loan's expected return. We
choose a simple parametric form that is consistent with
our earlier assumptions about the bank's credit screening
technology and also possesses sensible implications (see
Gorton & Pennacchi, 1995, for a similar treatment):
p að Þ ¼ α⋅e−η⋅a;
where α and η are positive parameters, 0 < α < 1, and
η > 1.
p
0
að Þ ¼ −αη⋅e−η⋅a < 0; p00 að Þ ¼ αη2⋅e−η⋅a > 0; p 0ð Þ
¼ α; p ∞ð Þ ¼ 0:
Thus, p′′(a)/(−p′(a)) = η. Using Equation (6) to substitute
p′(a) in Equation (5), we obtain the solution of b as follows:
b ¼ 1 − R
I−Rf
Rf
cþ R
I
Rf 2
c
 2
þ 4Δ R
I
Rf 2
c
" #1
2
−
RI − Rf
Rf
cþ R
I
Rf 2
c
 
2Δ
;
(8)
in which
Δ ¼ η R
I
Rf
θ
Rf
− RL
 
− θ − RL
  
:
From Equation (8), we can see that b is increasing in
Δ and lim
Δ→∞
b ¼ 1. On the other hand, b ≥ 0 if and only
if Δ ≥ 0. This gives a threshold level of risk‐free interest
rate R
f
:
R
f ≡
RL2 þ 4RIθ θ−RL  	1=2 − RL
2 θ − RL
  : (9)
If Rf ≤ Rf , the bank will securitize a portion b of its
loan according to Equation (8); if Rf > R
f
, the bank will
not securitize any loan, that is, b = 0. In addition, because
Δ is decreasing in R f , it is straightforward to show that, if
Rf ≤ Rf , the lower the risk‐free interest rate, the larger is
the portion of the loan securitized. The bank can do so
because an interest rate cut reduces the opportunity cost
of the security buyers' funds and the bank therefore does
not need to keep high retention level to signal its monitor-
ing effort.The existence of R
f
is interesting but not surprising.
As discussed before, issuing MBS has benefits as well as
costs, with both depending on the policy rate. When pol-
icy rate is high, the price of MBS is low and the external
finance becomes less appealing. When Rf > R
f
, the cost
of security buyers' fund is “too high” that, due to the
lemon property of the MBS,2 securitization is not the opti-
mal choice for the bank. This explains the increase in
MBS in the United States in 2002 when the Fed cut the
interest rate to a historical low level. This occurred not
because security buyers did not understand the lemons
problem of MBS (as argued by Dokko et al., 2009) but
because they increased their risk appetite when the cost
of funds became significantly lower. Formally, we have
the following lemma and proposition regarding the opti-
mal retention level:Lemma 1. There exists a threshold level R
f
such that the bank will securitize a portion b
of its loan if and only if Rf ≤ Rf . Rf is deter-
mined by Equation (9).Proof: See Appendix A.Proposition 1. If Rf ≤ Rf , the lower the inter-
est rate, ceteris paribus, the greater is the por-
tion of loans securitized by the bank; that is,
b is decreasing in R f .Proof: See Appendix A.
We provide a numerical example in Figure 3, where
the calibrations of our model parameters are shown in
Table 1. In particular, regarding the bank's monitoring
technology, we let α = 0.99 and η = 10; the return rate
in the good state is assumed to be RH = 1.2, whereas that
in the bad state is assumed to be RL = 1; bank's equity
requires a return rate of RI = 1.1; and the cost of
TABLE 1 Calibration of the model
α η RH RL c RI R f
0.99 10 1.2 1 0.1 1.1 1.05
ZHANG AND XU 7monitoring is c = 0.1. The principle of this calibration is
to make sure that these parameters do not violate our
assumptions and they approximate realities. Notice that
the predictions given by Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 do
not depend on the special choices of parameters value.
The numerical example shown here simply serves as pro-
viding a more intuitive understanding of our model.
We vary the policy rate from 1.05 (or 5%) to RL, and
Figure 3 shows that the securitization level b increases
as the interest rate reduces. As stated before, when the
risk‐free rate becomes lower, risky investment becomes
more attractive, the value of the loan retained as signal
of the bank's monitoring effort decreases, and the bank
tends to securitize larger portions of its investment.
In addition, Equation (6) determines the optimal mon-
itoring level. Because bank's retention of the loan (1 − b)
decreases when interest rate is lower, an interest rate cut
reduces the bank's monitoring effort. In addition, Equa-
tion (7) shows that k decreases as the policy rate becomes
lower (the bank supplies less equity and becomes more
levered). These results are consistent with the empirical
findings of Maddaloni and Peydro (2011). Interest rate
cut reduces the cost on repaying deposit. With the solvency
problem alleviated, depositors will allow the bank to lever-
age up. This shows risk taking of banks under lower policy
rate. We formally have the following Proposition 2:Proposition 2. Ceteris paribus, an interest
rate cut induces the bank to take up more risk
by decreasing the monitoring of investment
projects and increasing the leverage.Proof: See Appendix A.
The literature has widely argued on securitization
leading to the lax screening of banks (Berndt & Gupta,
2009; Keys et al., 2010; Purnanandam, 2011; Wang &
Xia, 2014). Our model supports this argument. Particu-
larly, Equation (6) implies that when a bank sells a por-
tion of its loan (b > 0), the level of credit monitoring, a,
is less than it would be if the bank had retained the entire
loan (b = 0). The reduced monitoring effort level is a
result of the moral hazard problem of banks, as discussed
earlier; Equation (6) shows that, ceteris paribus, the
larger the portion of loans securitized, the smaller is the
monitoring effort.
However, our model also shows that the loan amount
securitized is a function of policy rate. Thus, we cannot
directly conclude whether a policy rate cut or securitiza-
tion alone is more significant in driving the risk‐takingbehaviour of banks. Theoretically, however, as MBS have
lemon‐like features, the incentives of banks to securitize
more or securitize loans of poorer quality can be
expected, and investors price them. In fact, banks try to
minimize this information asymmetry problem by opti-
mally choosing the loan portion to securitize. To sell
MBS at a higher price, some banks securitize loans of bet-
ter quality and retain those of poorer quality (Jiang,
Nelson, & Vytlacil, 2014). This MBS pricing argument
shows that the lemon problem, to a certain extent,
restrains the risk‐taking incentive following the origi-
nate‐to‐distribute model. In fact, Lemma 1 in the previous
subsection shows that banks will securitize their loans
only when interest rate is too low. Monetary easing not
only affects the banks' cost of funds and provides them
with incentives to take more risk but also has the direct
effect of reducing the security buyers' cost of funds. In this
sense, monetary policy can be a stronger and wider vari-
able affecting the general attitude towards risks. Thus,
we argue that Fed's persistent monetary easing during
2001 and 2005 was the reason of excessive risk‐taking of
financial market. In fact, our argument explains why
MBS did not erupt until 2002 (see Figure 1).3.4 | The role of financial regulation and
banks' regulatory capital arbitrage
In reality, commercial banks are subjected to regulatory
capital constraint. For example, Basel Accord III requires
that the commonly equity tier 1 over the RWAs of com-
mercial banks must be greater than 4.5%. In our model,
if none of the investment is securitized, the commonly
equity tier 1 is k and RWA is the total investment of size
1 (we assume that the risk weight on the loan is 1). Accord-
ing to regulation, we thus have k ≥ 4.5%. This regulatory
capital constraint is exogenously given, and according to
many discussions in the literature, financial deregulation
attributed largely to the financial innovation such as mas-
sive securitization (Bernanke, 2010; Dokko et al., 2009).
In our model, nevertheless, financial regulation, rather
than deregulation, actually provides another motive for
banks to securitize investment. As Equation (7) shows,
when R f approaches to RL, k approaches to 0 (see Appen-
dix A for the proof). The same property applies when b= 0.
This might violate the regulatory capital constraint. How-
ever, by securitization, the bank removes part of the risky
asset off its book and replaces it with riskless liquidity. If b
share is securitized and 1 − b is retained, RWA in this case
is 1 − b, and the regulatory capital constraint becomes
k
1 − b
≥ 4:5%. The smaller the retention, the smaller is
the equity required according to regulation.
8 ZHANG AND XUTherefore, there is a mechanism that financial regula-
tion motivates banks' securitization. Suppose there is no
securitization for a start. When policy rate is low, banks
leverage up (Equation 7 when b = 0). Further policy rate
cut causes k to decrease and approach to the regulation
limit. As MBS provide a convenient vehicle for banks to
remove their high‐risk and low‐liquidity loans from the
balance sheet and replace them with cash, or in other
words, MBS relaxes the regulatory capital constraint from
k ≥ 4.5% to
k
1 − b
≥ 4:5%, banks have incentive to securi-
tize their investment such that they can reduce the supply
of equity further. This phenomenon is often referred to as
regulatory capital arbitrage (Ambrose, Lacour‐Little, &
Sanders, 2005; Kashyap, Rajan, & Stein, 2008). It con-
trasts to the view that blames financial deregulation for
the massive securitization. Figure 4 gives an example of
how financial regulation provides incentives for banks
to securitize.4 | MODEL: RISK ‐AVERSE BANKS
In this section, we consider risk‐averse banks to feature
their need for credit risk sharing. The basic structure of
risky investment and monitoring technology is the same
as previously mentioned, except that banks nowmaximize
their utility U(.) instead of the expected profit. The
assumption of risk‐averse banks implies that U(.) is
increasing and concave and that, formally, U′(.) > 0, U′′
(.) < 0, and U(0) = 0. All other agents, namely, theFIGURE 4 The incentives to securitize. (The solid red curve
gives the actual equity input of the bank, and the dashed red
curve gives the potential optimal equity input when the policy rate
decreases. For a start, securitization is not allowed such that
regulatory capital constraint is given by k > 4.5%. Because the
optimal equity input is lower than the regulation limit, banks have
the incentive to securitize.) [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]depositors and security buyers, are still risk neutral. We
show that besides internal need for liquidity, banks have
an incentive to transfer their risk to third parties by securi-
tizing their loans. Interest rate cuts strengthen this incen-
tive, and banks securitize larger portions of their loans.
If we denote the share of loan securitized and sold as
b, the bank's return in case of success is RH(1 − b) +
T − c(a) − R f (1 − k), and its return in case of bad state
is RL(1 − b) + T − c(a) − R f (1 − k). T is the liquidity
generated from selling MBS. Because the security buyers
are risk neutral, the following participation constraint
still holds:
1 − p að Þð ÞRHbþ p að ÞRLb ¼ Rf T:
The bank maximizes
max
a; b; k
U ¼ 1 − p að Þð ÞU RH 1 − bð Þ þ T − c að Þ − Rf 1 − kð Þ 
þ p að ÞU RL 1 − bð Þ þ T − c að Þ − Rf 1 − kð Þ  − RIk
s:t: RL 1 − bð Þ þ T − c að Þ ≥ Rf 1 − kð Þ (i)
1 − p að Þð ÞRHbþ p að ÞRLb ¼ Rf T (ii)
U ≥ U* (iii)
0 ≤ b ≤ 1 (iv)
Constraint (i) is the solvency constraint imposed by
depositors, exactly the same as Equation (2) for the case
of risk‐neutral banks. Constraint (ii) determines the price
of the MBS. Constraint (iii) indicates that the bank will
securitize its loan if and only if its utility from doing so
is not less than that from not doing so. In this constraint,
U* is the maximized utility level when there is no
securitization,3 or,
U* ¼ max
a; k
1 − p að Þð ÞU RH − c að Þ − Rf 1 − kð Þ 
þp að ÞU RL − c að Þ − Rf 1 − kð Þ  − RIks:t:
RL − c að Þ ≥ Rf 1 − kð Þ:
To solve this problem, we assume that constraint (iii) is
not binding. We examine whether this constraint is satis-
fied through an ex post test. The optimal solutions are
given by
b ¼ 1 − 1
RH − RL
U
0−1
RI
Rf
θ
Rf
− RL
 
1 − pð Þ RH − RL 
2664
3775; (10)
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0
að Þ ¼ − R
Ic
RfU RH − RL
 
1 − bð Þ 	þ RI
Rf
RH − RL
 
b
;
(11)
k ¼ 1 −
θ
Rf
bþ RL 1 − bð Þ − c að Þ
Rf
: (12)
Equation (10) determines the optimal portion of
loans to securitize. Under the assumption that U′′
(.) < 0, it is straightforward to see that b is decreasing
in R f . This confirms our prediction that following an
interest rate cut, the bank will securitize and sell a larger
portion of its loan.
For risk‐averse banks, sharing credit risk is another
incentive to sell MBS. However, selling MBS incurs a cost
from the adverse selection problem when MBS are
“undervalued.” When the policy rate is high, the inves-
tors' opportunity cost to purchase MBS is large and the
adverse selection problem becomes more severe. For the
same MBS, its price will be lower if interest rate is higher.
In this case, it might not be optimal for the bank to sell
MBS, or, in other words, constraint (iii) might not be sat-
isfied. For example, assume that the utility function has
the form U(x) = xσ, where 0 < σ < 1. Now, Figure 5 shows
the relationship between the bank's utility and risk‐free
interest rate.
From Figure 5, when the interest rate is high, not to
securitize means higher utility for the bank because, if
the monetary policy is tight, the bank restrains itself from
risk taking in the first place and the gain from risk
sharing through securitization becomes limited. On the
other hand, because the security buyers' cost of funds is
high, they would require a larger retention and higher
monitoring effort. Put these two effects together (the gainFIGURE 5 The bank's utility as a function of risk‐free interest
rate [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]is limited, whereas the cost is large), selling MBS results
in lower utility for the bank than retaining all its
investment.
However, when the interest rate is low, the results
are reversed. Banks take too much risk in an easy envi-
ronment, and risk sharing brings in significant utility
gain. Meanwhile, security buyers would demand only a
small retention, and the cost of MBS would decrease.
The utility of banks selling MBS would surpass that of
retaining all their loans. In our model, there exists a
threshold value of risk‐free rate R
f
; if Rf < R
f
, the bank
will securitize its loans. The lower the interest rate, the
stronger would be the bank's incentive to securitize. Risk
sharing brings about a utility gain only when the mone-
tary policy rate is low.Lemma 2. There exists a threshold level R
f
such that the risk averse bank will securitize
a portion b of its loan if and only if Rf ≤ R
f
.Proof: See our simulation result (Figure 5) and the
above discussion.Proposition 3. If Rf ≤ R
f
, ceteris paribus, an
interest rate cut enables a risk‐averse bank to
securitize a larger portion of its loans. Here, b
is decreasing in risk‐free interest rate.Proof: See Equation (10).5 | DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A low short‐term interest rate is historically seen to
have preceded many financial crises (Calomiris, 2008).
For the recent crisis, low monetary policy rate may have
had greater impact, given the concurrence of high‐level
financial innovation. Some empirical studies have
shown that a low monetary policy rate is crucial for risk
taking because a significant bank agency problem can
turn abundant liquidity into an excessive softening of
lending standards (Maddaloni & Peydro, 2011). Other
empirical studies have shown that financial innovation
(securitization) significantly amplified risk taking or is
the main reason for risk taking (Keys et al., 2010; Mian
& Sufi, 2009). What is not shown is that a low monetary
policy rate may motivate banks to securitize, and this is
what this study investigates.
We analyse a bank and security buyers' behaviour
model in which implicit contract features make securiti-
zation incentive compatible. If the seller bank retains a
fraction of the loan it securitizes, this would explain
why market participants buy the security. Because of
10 ZHANG AND XUinformation asymmetry between the sellers and buyers,
implicit contract features restrict sellers from exploiting
their informational advantage over the buyers by taking
additional risk or securitizing riskier mortgages. Thus,
financial innovation alone cannot explain the excessive
risk‐taking behaviour of banks when the security buyers
are smart. Without additional factors, it would be difficult
to explain the financial innovation that erupted in early
2000s. The low monetary policy rate, nevertheless, does
explain the excessive risk taking and the eruption of
financial innovation.
A low monetary policy rate leads to cheap credit so
that banks rationally leverage up and reduce their moni-
toring effort. This leads to the build‐up of risk on banks'
assets, further providing them with strong incentives to
securitize and sell those assets. On the other hand, a
low monetary policy reduces the cost of funds for security
buyers, who would then accept high‐risk securities at
high prices. Without easy monetary policy, security
buyers would demand a high return on the securities
and thereby dampen the gain of securitization.
This study therefore complements our previous
research (Xu & Zhang, 2017) on the cause of the U.S.
housing bubble. We show that low interest rate not only
directly boomed the mortgage lending and softened
banks' lending standards but also was an important
motive for banks to securitize. Massive financial innova-
tions were not the cause of the housing bubble but a
rational response of banks to easy monetary policy.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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without loss of generality.
2 Selling MBS of ((1 − p(a))RH + p(a)RL)b in exchange for T is
discounted by risk‐free interest rate. Ceteris paribus, higher R f
means lower price of the MBS.
3 For detailed solution of U*, see Appendix A.ORCID
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We provide supplementary explanations of properties and
predictions of our models.A.1 | Benefit of issuing MBS
In the risk neutral bank model, if the bank securitize b
share of the investment, the return of the investment in
case of failure is given by eR ¼ RL 1 − bð Þ þ T − c að Þ,
where T is given by Equation (1):
12 ZHANG AND XU1 − p að Þð ÞRHbþ p að ÞRLb ≥ Rf T:
Substitute T, we have
eR ¼ RL 1 − bð Þ þ 1 − p að Þð ÞRH þ p að ÞRL
Rf
b − c að Þ:
On the other hand, if the bank does not securitize,
that is, b = 0, the return of the investment in case of fail-
ure is given by RL − c(a). Therefore, eR > RL − c að Þ if and
only if
1 − p að Þð ÞRH þ p að ÞRL
Rf
> RL:
As we have assumed that (1 − p(0))RH + p(0)RL ≥ R f ,
it is straightforward to show that
1 − p að Þð ÞRH þ p að ÞRL
Rf
>
1 − p 0ð Þð ÞRH þ p 0ð ÞRL
Rf
> 1 ≥ RL:
Therefore, selling MBS brings gains in case of invest-
ment failure, and this is one benefit of issuing MBS. With
such benefit, the bank's solvency constraint is relaxed,
and it can leverage up more.
A.2 | Proof of Lemma 1 and Propositions 1 and 2
Equation (8) determines the optimal retention when the
bank securitizes its investment.
where Δ ¼ η R
I
Rf
θ
Rf
− RL
 
− θ − RL
  
. It is straightfor-
ward to see that
∂b
∂Δ
> 0, limΔ → ∞b = 1.
Because
∂Δ
∂Rf
< 0, and the expected return rate of
investment θ≡ RH(1− p(a)) + RLp(a) has the property that
θ ≥ RH 1 − p 0ð Þð Þ þ RLp 0ð Þ ≥ Rf ;
there is an upper bound of Δ, which is achieved when R f
approaches to R
L
.
Therefore, 0 ≤ b < 1 if and only if Δ ≥ 0, which gives
the threshold level of risk‐free interest rate R
f
such thatR
f ≡
RL2 þ 4RIθ θ−RL  	1=2 − RL
2 θ − RL
 
When Rf ≤ Rf , b ≥ 0, and
∂b
∂Rf
< 0.
In addition, by Equations 6 and 7, and use the prop-
erty of
∂b
∂Rf
< 0, it is straightforward to see that
∂p0 að Þ
∂Rf
¼ c
RH − RL
1
1−bð Þ2
∂b
∂Rf
< 0:
Because p′′(a) > 0, we thus have
∂a
∂Rf
> 0. Lower policy
rate reduces monitoring effort level. Besides, as
θ
Rf
> 1 ≥ RL, we obtain
∂k
∂Rf
> 0.A.3 | U* in risk‐averse bank model
U* ¼ max
a; k
1 − p að Þð ÞU RH − c að Þ − Rf 1 − kð Þ 
þp að ÞU RL − c að Þ − Rf 1 − kð Þ 
− RIks:t: RL − c að Þ ≥ Rf 1 − kð Þ:
The first‐order conditions with respect to monitoring
effort a and equity input k are given by
p
0
að Þ ¼ − R
Ic
RfU RH − RL
 ; (A1)
k ¼ 1 − R
L − c að Þ
Rf
: (A2)
Equations A1 and A2 show that the optimal monitor-
ing effort and leverage ratio depend on the risk‐free rate.
It is straightforward to see that, with interest rate cut, the
bank reduces its monitoring effort and equity input (or
leverages up). When b = 0, Equations 11 and 12 boil
down to Equations A1 and A2.
U* is utility obtained when a and k are determined by
Equations A1 and A2.
